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 This report focuses on my research into Governor Nelson Rockefeller’s role in the 
expansion of the State University of New York (SUNY) in general and the Buffalo campus in 
particular for my new book project, The Business of Education: The Corporate Reconstruction of 
American Public Universities. This manuscript seeks to rewrite the story of twentieth-century 
public postsecondary schooling in the United States through a reconsideration of both national 
policies but also case studies that show how a variety of institutions in different regions evolved 
into the sprawling, research-focused system of “multi-versities,” which replaced the private, 
independent liberal arts college as the exemplar of American higher education. This project 
emphasizes that state universities have always been dependent on private benefactors because 
local, state, and federal governments never provided enough funding to support these 
institutions. Indeed, the transformation of struggling teachers’ colleges into universities (like 
Arizona State University), the expansion of existing public universities (like the University of 
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North Carolina, Chapel Hill), the maturation of land-grant colleges into universities (like 
Michigan State University), the creation of entirely new branch campuses (like the University of 
California, San Diego), and the private bankrupt schools made into public universities (like 
SUNY-Buffalo) shows that partnerships between business interests, educators, and state officials 
were critical to higher education’s late twentieth-century expansion. 
Rockefeller was pivotal to one of my most important case studies: SUNY and its Buffalo 
campus. Like many states in the Northeast and Midwest, New York had long entrusted higher 
learning to private colleges and universities, like the University of Buffalo. Indeed, New York 
state never created a land-grant college under the 1862 Morrill Land-Grant Act but instead 
designated private Cornell University the state’s land-grant institution. Indeed, New York would 
be the last state in the continental United States to start a university system. But SUNY’s 1948 
creation had been governor Thomas Dewey’s attempt to seem in favor of mass higher education 
during his 1948 run for the presidency. He, in fact, had little interest in expanding New York’s 
public postsecondary options, then largely limited to teachers’ colleges. He dramatically left the 
campaign trail to sign a bill that created SUNY, but also delayed its commencement by a year, 
time enough for hostile legislators to repeal the law. They failed to do so in 1949, but that 
legislation still created a system in paper, not in practice. Indeed, SUNY languished for much of 
the 1950s, even after voters approved a 1957 referendum to expand the system. Then-governor 
William Averell Harriman failed to use this money, which made SUNY’s expansion a key 
talking-point in Rockefeller’s successful bid for governor.1  
Most Rockefeller biographers emphasize that SUNY’s development was perhaps his 
greatest achievement as governor. Few, however, spend more than a few paragraphs on what he 
actually did to expand SUNY into this country’s largest higher education system, which for a 
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time seemed poised to replace the University of California as the exemplar of American public 
higher education. Yet none of the branches, or the system as a whole, remained in the 
postsecondary schooling avant-garde, a failure that many scholars have reflexively assumed to 
be the fault of too much rapid growth.
2
  
The governor’s records show SUNY’s history to be far more complicated. First and 
foremost, Rockefeller’s campaign files reveal that he promoted SUNY’s expansion in 1958 as a 
means of economic development, especially for upstate cities (like Buffalo).
3
 Many historians 
have asserted that this urban powerhouse of the once-mighty Steelbelt only rusted, like other 
former manufacturing metropolises, in the 1970s.
4
 Rockefeller’s office files are an invaluable 
source because they have been preserved as his staff kept them; office memos, constituent letters, 
staff responses, and key reports remain together in the subject files that Rockefeller’s aides 
created.
5
 These incredibly rich records make clear that he and others were keenly aware of a 
declining industrial base that was draining upstate counties of revenue, employment opportunity, 
and population in the early Cold War era.
6
 Moreover, his office files show many upstate 
communities considered SUNY’s expansion as an economic lifeline. Their enthusiasm predates 
the period during which most scholars have asserted that “eds and meds” became important to 
city revenues and plans for rejuvenation.
7
 Excitement across New York state hence challenges 
long-held historical assumptions. Indeed, the files reveal that residents wrote to Rockefeller 
personally to draw his attention to the abandoned factories that many considered perfect for a 
SUNY campus. These education outposts, many hoped, would not just bring investments and 
people into the area but also offer the kind of instruction for children and adults who could no 
longer expect to find employment in heavy manufacturing.
8
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Rockefeller’s gubernatorial files also reveal the complicated financial arrangements that 
imperiled SUNY’s long-term financial health and ability to grow. Many researchers have already 
noted the risky financing woven throughout the governor’s now-infamous moral obligation 
bonds.
9
 In the case of public higher education, the SUNY Construction Fund was of the utmost 
importance in funding expansion quickly without legislative approval. This work-around was in 
fact critical to SUNY’s rapid growth because Rockefeller correctly realized that he could not find 
guaranteed support among legislators or even voters, who rejected a referendum to provide more 
money for public postsecondary schooling in the early years of Rockefeller’s rule.10  
Less well-known examples of his administration’s university funding include state 
student aid programs. Early 1960s New York stood out in the nation for creating a means to help 
students find loans for their education. Historically, such financing had been largely in the form 
of short-term, high-interest loans available either through private lenders or schools. The 1958 
National Defense Education Act had provided some small, short-term federal loans for students 
studying the sciences or languages, but co-eds largely remained on their own to pay for their 
postsecondary schooling.
11
 The Rockefeller Administration helped students find lenders through 
the Higher Education Assistance Corporation, created in his first term. This executive agency 
clearly shaped the kind of programs offered under the federal 1965 Higher Education Act. The 
State of New York specifically worked with the kind of small banks, usually upstate, that had 
expanded into consumer loans in order to compete for customers. This program had the effect of 
both helping these bankers and infusing private capital into both public and private schools.
12
 
Competition and tuition were also pillars of the Rockefeller Administration’s regents 
scholarships, another landmark program that provided a small amount of state money to be put 
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towards tuition for high school seniors receiving top marks on the state’s Regents’ exam. These 
funds could be used at any school in New York state, public or private.
13
  
Few researchers have realized that this instate caveat was critical to Rockefeller ending 
private colleges and universities’ long-standing, corrosive objection to expanding public higher 
education across the state. Rockefeller publicly celebrated these fellowships as an award to the 
state’s best-and-brightest; his private files reveal them to be a covert means of keeping residents 
from going to school elsewhere, while also giving an indirect state subsidy to private schools 
(like the University of Buffalo) and offering public institutions additional state financing. Most 
private colleges and universities, except for well-endowed elite institutions, were heavily 
dependent on tuition and feared competing with far cheaper state universities for co-eds. Hence, 
Rockefeller aides continually rebuffed voters who wanted to use their fellowships at out-of-state 
schools, which may have been cheaper options or had the majors that recipients needed.
14
  
This clandestine infusion of cash to New York schools also reflected Rockefeller’s 
insistence that SUNY students pay to go to school. This mandate reflected his concern that 
undergraduates feel an obligation to their alma mater and subsequently shoulder some of their 
educational costs,
15
 which was reflected in his demand that CUNY begin charging tuition. City 
schools only relented after Rockefeller left office and Gotham’s fiscal crisis made fees 
unavoidable.
16
 Nonetheless, his insistence had an unintended consequence on all New York 
schools: tuition remained critical to funding higher education and rates would dramatically 
escalate as state support declined.
17
  
Rockefeller presided over SUNY’s initial retrenchment, which had as much to do with a 
frustrated electorate as a cash-strapped state government. Those issues become clear in the 
struggle to merge the private, tuition-dependent, underfunded University of Buffalo with SUNY. 
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Most researchers have blamed campus presidents for SUNY-Buffalo’s fraught emergence.18 Yet 
the gubernatorial records indicate a far more complicated story, which involved students, 
professors, administrators, residents, state officials, and national politics. Many residents 
embraced Rockefeller's ideas for using educational investment to regenerate this beleaguered 
city. Buffalo had been an economic and political powerhouse in the nineteenth century, when the 
Great Lakes had been the conduit to the Middle and Far West. Many residents wrote in to 
describe their vision of SUNY expansion occurring on the run-down lakefront, which would 
revitalize surrounding parts of the city with an influx of students, staff, and research dollars. 
Moreover, many were initially relieved that Rockefeller would hire from the local building 
trades, whose union members desperately needed jobs.
19
  
Residents soon expressed numerous frustrations. Many distrusted new president Martin 
Meyerson, whose New York City roots, Jewish sensibilities, and years spent overseeing the 
University of California, Berkeley concerned the Protestant, conservative members of Buffalo’s 
civic elite. They and their constituents complained that the merger that he oversaw seemed to 
progress too slowly. They moreover wondered why their children, who may have won a 
Regents’ fellowship, could still not find a seat in a SUNY campus and use this tuition relief. 
Their taxes, after all, were supposed to be paying for new classrooms, instructors, and degree 
programs. These irate voters first blamed the slow pace of expansion on union rules that seemed 
to delay construction and then blamed Rockefeller’s insistence on following new federal civil 
rights protections. Few scholars have remembered that the University of Buffalo’s merger with 
SUNY also served as an early experiment in how to meet President Lyndon Baines Johnson’s 
decrees to provide affirmative action for minorities. The governor and his aides’ decision to 
follow this executive order frustrated residents. Union leaders, for example, refused to abide by 
 7 
Rockefeller’s orders, which created a standoff between the governor, local civil rights 
organizations, and trade union locals, and resulted in construction being halted for more than a 
year. Local parents, who were overwhelmingly white, sided with the white unionists whom they 
once blamed for the merger’s deliberate pace. When these taxpayers expressed their concerns to 
the governor, they also wondered why minorities and student radicals had been admitted to 
SUNY-Buffalo instead of their children. These self-identified white working- and middle-class 
parents asked the governor what he intended to do for their ilk who struggled to afford the ever-
increasing expense of higher education. Costs included living expenses but also rising tuition 
rates, which were necessary to continue funding a public system that had always assumed it 
would partially rely on tuition.
20
  
Fees soared in the 1970s, when more factories closed in upstate New York, a fiscal crisis 
gripped Manhattan, and inflation limited the spending power of all Americans. In this economic 
climate, New York legislators could hardly be convinced to spend more money on public higher 
education to ease the reliance on tuition. Politicians instead embraced austerity in all public 
services, which (as Rockefeller’s office files revealed) forced the Regents to continually redraft 
their plans for SUNY.
21
 
My research at the Rockefeller Archive Center has hence provided me with rich material 
to understand both the distinct trajectory of the SUNY system and its Buffalo campus but also 
how such Steelbelt schools fit into a larger national narrative. The importance of an educational 
experiment like SUNY (an example of a private school becoming public in the 1960s) and the 
state-level financing behind the mid-century expansion of higher education transforms scholarly 
but also public understanding of the contemporary crisis in American mass higher education. By 
understanding the complicated public-private origins of research-focused, state universities, the 
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defenders of public schools can hopefully better defend these basic public goods and envision 
how they might be made truly accessible, affordable, and fiscally sound. After all, as Governor 
Rockefeller’s files make clear, today’s journalists, administrators, politicians, parents, and 
students cannot offer to protect, much less resurrect, purely public universities and systems if 
they never really existed.  
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